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Is corporate governance maturing or moving in the wrong direction? Twenty five years ago the 
Report of the Committee on the Financial Aspects of Corporate Governance (Cadbury, 1992) was 
published. The work of this group chaired by Sir Adrian Cadbury has had such a significant impact 
on the development of corporate governance in many jurisdictions that a history of the committee 
itself has been produced (Spira, 2013). The principles they set out in 1992 may still resonate today, 
but have the elaboration, review and application of the resulting code and the work of subsequent 
committees added value or resulted in a loss of focus and too many detailed rules? Has prescription 
replaced discretion and the thinking application of principles to particular circumstances? 
 
Questionning Contemporary Governance  
 
Is there now too much emphasis upon ticking boxes on checklists, compliance and the avoidance of 
risk (Coulson-Thomas, 2017a & b)? Is enough attention given to innovation and entrepreneurship? 
Have there been fewer corporate governance failures? Are today's directors noticeably more 
competent? Are boards evidently more effective? Are they taking better decisions? How applicable 
and helpful are today's corporate governance codes to non-listed companies, public bodies, 
professional practices, voluntary organisations, SMEs and family businesses? What about the non-
financial aspects of corporate governance? How relevant to emerging markets is a UK or US 
approach to corporate governance, as compared with, say, a South African one (Mishra et al, 2013)?   
 
Is more than asking a company secretary to check compliance with a governance code required? 
The duties of company secretaries were summarised and significant at the time the Cadbury 
Committee was at work (ICSA, 1992), but should boards themselves ask more fundamental 
questions about their role, how they operate and the value of ritualistic events such as monthly 
board meetings? What do many boards contribute? Given the variety of listed companies, should 
we worry about the lack of diversity and innovation in governance arrangements? Should we be 
concerned rather than pleased that companies in such differing circumstances are so compliant with 
a particular model? Why don't more boards justify doing something different that is right for them?  
 
Has corporate governance reached a cross roads or has it already lost its way? Does it need to 
change direction? Compliance with goverance codes may have had an impact upon board 
structures. However, what impact if any has the contemporary corporate governance community 
had upon the behaviours of directors and boards? Has it forgotten the interests of key stakholder 
groups and the responsibility of directors to work for the future success of a company? Why has it 
taken them so long to recognise the importance of director, board and corporate behaviours? Do we 
need to revisit the basic purposes of a board and the legal duties and responsibilities of directors, or 
is the issue that they are too often forgotten? 
 
Issues, Trends and Perspectives  
 
The London Global Convention provides an opportunity to reassess the relevance and effectiveness 
of current governance arrangements. Some intending delegates might already be thinking about 
how they and the boards upon which they sit might add more value. What would they like to see 
more of and/or less of? What principles and practices of corporate governance and reporting are 
conducive of remaining relevant, current and competitive? What about inclusion, sustainability, the 
environment and social responsibilities? What would foster the investment, responsible conduct and 
innovation needed to address business, economic, social and community challenges and seize 
opportunities? Could governance changes contribute to greater innovation in the public sector 
(Torfing and Triantafillou, 2016)? Must the process of Government remain largely a no go area? 
 
Is corporate governance stuck in a groove? Are there too many vested interests in favour of ever 
more rules and costly compliance? If convergence of standards and practices is occuring, is this 
because similar lessons are being learned in different places, or because local circumstances and 
different requirements are not being addressed? Should directors look beyond standard models and 
current codes and establish an approach that is right for a particular company and board in relation 
to the situation they are in, the company's activities and stage of development, the board's aims and 
the challenges and opportunities it faces? Are there other sources of advice or guidance?  
 
Boards face a range of issues, such as disruptive technologies and new business models at a time of 
uncertainty and unpredictability. Trends and developments need to be monitored and their possible 
impacts assessed. Changes to governance arrangements may be required where appropriate. Too 
often governance is a structure set in concrete rather than a flexible, living and learning system that 
is continually adapting to change. Will Governments and regulators engage and be alert to rapidly 
evolving requirements? Can their processes move quickly enough to enable adaptation to occur? 
For example, how might regulation and governance be applied to the sharing economy and crowd-
based capitalism and to activities, networks and institutions related to them (Sundarajan, 2016)? 
 
Managing Risk and Preventing Fraud 
 
A board has to balance the creativity and entrepreneurial risk involved in making progress and 
building a business with the prudence and control needed to comply with rules, policies, laws and 
regulations. Business development needs to be legal, responsible and sustainable. When significant 
numbers of people cooperate, freedom is often conducive of innovation. However, the concentration 
of power and authority may also be required to ensure order, alignment and collaboration and to 
enable choices and collective decisions to be made (Durant and Durant, 1968). In the case of many 
boards, is there a danger that they might become overloaded to the extent that directors narrow their 
focus, consider fewer options and take less rational decisions (Allison, 1971, Allison and Zelikow, 
1999)? For many companies, is this an actual or potential governance related risk? 
 
Directors need to ensure that companies do not incur levels of risk that are disproportionate or 
excessive in relation to likely returns and what is acceptable to investors and other stakeholders. 
Boards should establish a risk appetite for various corporate activities. What is thought to be 
desirable in one area might be inappropriate in another. Although profitable, some behaviours and 
forms of conduct  might be socially unacceptable and/or give rise to legal and/or financial penalties. 
Risks need to be managed and, where necessary, compliance assured without inhibiting innovation. 
 
Situations, circumstances and business models can change. To remain relevant and competitive, one 
may need both resilience and flexibility. Nettles may have to be grasped. If risks must be incurred 
and/or emanate from outside a company, how might they be best mitigated and reduced? Some 
areas of risk such as fraud and a range of cyber threats are ever present. How might they be 
prevented and, if they occur, how should recovery be achieved ? How can one ensure that risk based 
approaches to compliance and internal and external audit reflect the actual risks facing a company 
and do not frustrate creativity, innovation and entrepreneurship (Coulson-Thomas, 2017a & b)? 
 
Fraud, cyber security lapses and corruption harm many people. Addressing such risks can require 
vigilance, appropriate conduct and collaboration across a company's operations and network of 
relationships. Are some boards too concerned with the financial priorities of certain investors at the 
expense of the wider interests of other stakeholders? How might an element of democracy and 
greater stakeholder involvement be introduced into the running of a company? Would this be 
desirable? Is it inevitable where there are alternatives to a company and stakeholders have a choice? 
 
Stakeholder Engagement and Relationships 
 
How many directors revisit past assumptions about the purpose of enterprise, or Charles Handy's 
(2002) question: “whats a business for”? How many boards voluntarily engage with the UN Global 
Compact (2000) initiative and report steps they take towards a more sustainable and socially 
responsible business? Unlike short-term and algorithm driven traders, are younger people more 
concerned with such issues? Do they hope that business leaders will show more commitment to a 
wider range of such interests? Are enough directors passionate about their companies and their 
contributions? Should directors and boards do more to show that they also care (Cardon, 2008)? 
 
For many companies, members of other stakeholder groups have more “skin in the game” than most 
shareholders. The income of employees and the welfare of their families may be totally dependent 
upon their jobs, whereas a small shareholding may be just one of many held by an investor. The loss 
of any one of these diversified investments might not be significant. Does corporate governance 
with its emphasis upon the rights of shareholders miss the bigger picture? The challenge for many 
boards is to maintain mutually beneficial relationships with a range of stakeholder groups and to 
avoid any one of them gaining disproportionately at the expense of the others.  
 
What are the do's and don't of shareholder engagement? Some of them may be interested in 
environmental, social and governance matters. Others may be short-term traders rather than long-
term investors. How can one achieve a value adding relationship without encouraging unwelcome 
interference by a motivated and unrepresentative minority of investors or other stakeholders? Might 
making special arrangements for shareholders result in their vested interests being pursued to the 
disadvantage of other stakeholders? How many shareholders have the competence, time, inclination 
and motivation to become more involved? Do they give their dividends priority over the long-term 
interests of companies? Might a vocal minority of responders become a distraction?  
 
Shareholder and Stakeholder Responsibilities 
 
Effective relationships can require commitment from all the parties involved. Prior to the Cadbury 
Report (1992) steps were taken by the Institutional Shareholders Committee (1991) and others to 
make shareholders aware of their responsibilities. The California Public Employees’Retirement 
System takes its stewardship responsibilities seriously and has set out its investment beliefs 
(CalPERS, 2015) and articulated what it considers to be global principles of corporate governance 
(CalPERS, 2011). Do more shareholders, especially institutional investors, need to emulate their 
example and/or step up to stewardship responsibilities such as those set out by the UK's Financial 
Reporting Council (2012) or Tomorrow's Company (2012)? Is there more that smaller shareholders 
could or should do? Would other stakeholder groups benefit from more guidance on how to engage 
with companies and their boards? 
 
Transparency and trust can build and sustain relationships. Would wider buy-in to a vision, mission 
and an ethical or performance culture, or to corporate goals, values, policies, strategies and 
objectives, make their achievement more likely? Where stakeholder involvment and community 
engagement is thought to be beneficial, how should one set priorities and best monitor, manage and 
resource the process? Do current governance requirements help or hinder wider engagement?  
 
Would dialogue and greater mutual understanding help to address the issue of short-termism, or are 
a wider set of actions required along the lines of those suggested by the review undertaken by John 
Kay (2012) of UK equity markets? Is the required collaboration and combination of steps needed 
for a more joined up approach likely to occur when those involved are busy and have other 
priorities? Given the fragmentation of responsibilities for better governance and the vested interests 
involved, is it unrealistic to expect a more comprehensive and coordinated improvement strategy? Is 
short-termism less of an issue for family owned companies, where controlling family members or 
trustees may feel less constrained by any other owners and more able to take a longer-term view?  
 
Widening Perspectives and Involvement  
 
Concentration of power in the hands of a strong and hopefully wise leader is one traditional 
governance solution, but even the best of people can make mistakes (Durant and Durant, 1968). As 
Lord Acton (1985) observed power corrupts. Unless constrained and guided by influential hands, 
the best of CEOs can go off the rails. Do CEOs of US listed companies in particular have too much 
power? To avoid autocracy and dictatorship, in many contexts at different points in history authority 
has been given to a group, whether an oligarchy or, in the case of a company, a board. The issue in 
political contexts can then become one of whether this minority is representative of the majority, or 
represents the particular interests or an elite. Directors of a company should endeavour to be free of 
obligations that constrain their independence and prime duty to the company itself.  
 
Directors should have regard to the interests of various stakeholders when board decisions are 
taken. Might widening involvement and devoting more attention to sustainability and the social 
responsibilities of business help to restore public trust in companies, governance arrangements and 
capitalism (Bowen, 1953)? When political power is in the hands of a minority, clique or small 
group, some means needs to be found of ensuring accountability to the majority (Durant and 
Durant, 1968). Where the latter are unable to exert influence on those in governance roles they may 
become disgruntled. Excluded individuals and groups may plot and scheme as they look for ways of 
exerting greater influence and bringing about change. If directors and boards are perceived to be 
acting against wider public interests, will there be more calls for Government intervention? 
 
Will boards be blamed as automation, internet businesses, self-service, e-government, robotics, 
drones, artificial intelligence, self-driving vehicles and the shared economy destroy and/or replace 
current jobs (Kaplan, 2015)? Will disaffection grow to the extent of triggering riots or a revolution? 
Some companies for various reasons have already faced shareholder revolts, employee resignations 
and defecting customers. How could digital technologies and social networking be used to engage 
stakeholders and build better relationships with them and with business and supply chain partners? 
Would different business, organisational and governance models better enable companies and 
communities to engage, collaborate and cope?   
 
Building Better Boards 
 
The consequences of inadequate governance are sometimes easier to identify than the benefits of 
better governance arrangements. Assessing impact upon performance is complicated by unrelated 
variables and the risk of identifying an association rather than a cause and effect relationship. The 
boards one encounters vary greatly in relevance, contribution and effectiveness. Some are rubber 
stamps managed by a strong CEO, CMD, chair and/or inner group. Others, preoccupied with 
internal, executive and operational matters, are not thinking longer-term and/or providing strategic 
direction. Are too many boards defensive and perpetuating and protecting past practices rather than 
being proactive and creating new options and choices (Coulson-Thomas, 2001)?   
 
How should boards provide strategic leadership and release latent capability, potential and talent 
across a company and its value chain? What steps can they take to encourage challenge, creativity, 
innovation and entrepreneurship (Coulson-Thomas, 2017c & d)? How should directors be helped to 
exercise independent thought in place of groupthink (Janis, 1972)? How might they become more 
engaged in formulating strategy? What should be done to increase awareness of cyber threats, or the 
possible implications of disruptive technologies and new business models? How might directors 
break away from a traditional board and committee structure to create one that best enables them to 
transact business as and when required? Can activities be monitored and controled without stifling 
them or constraining the search for better alternatives? 
 
Whether to better hold onto power and/or to improve their performance, confident boards enlist 
help and support. They are willing to learn from others and good practice elsewhere. They are also 
prepared to pioneer and go out in front. Control of resources allows them to hire relevant sources of 
advice. Could more and better use be made of a company secretary, a chief legal or risk officer, or 
an internal auditor? How might these professionals become less invisible and more indispensible? 
They may share a board's interest in good governance. With the right advisors they may be able to 
help a board and its members to evaluate their performance and identify areas for improvement.  
 
Legitimacy and Boards 
 
Sometimes the advice received by boards is too narrow or even erroneous. Strong individuals are 
sometimes told what others believe they would like to hear. Inputs are selected to coincide with 
existing prejudices or confirm what a group would already like to do. Following the 2008 financial 
crisis, could further consequences of governance failures that impact on total populations lead to 
more questioning of governance practices and the legitimacy of power exercised by strong CEOs? 
What further checks and balances could and should boards and/or regulators introduce? Might such 
intervention lead to unintended consequences and are there some risks for which regulation and 
other forms of intervention might not be appropriate (Better Regulation Commission, 2006)?  
 
Does the best hope of restoring public trust and ensuring perceived legitimacy lie in collective 
commitment to ensuring the competence of directors and the effectiveness of boards? Openness to 
ideas and possibilities and a willingness to listen and learn can lead to continual adaptation. This 
may be preferable to sudden and disruptive change that might threaten relationships and lead to 
further questioning of corporate conduct. On occasion, such as when a new business model has 
clear advantages, rapid adjustment may be needed to avoid being left behind. 
 
Even if they do not necessarily agree with them, people are often more comfortable with decisions 
if they believe that due process has been followed and the exercise of power has been legitimate. 
Hence the importance of effective board processes and procedures. Were other options or competing 
proposals considered? Is sufficient time allowed for the discussion of agenda items? Has a board 
exercised moral and ethical leadership? Is the right tone being set from the top? Is a board earning 
respect as a result of its own conduct? Is it behaving in a responsible and sustainable way? Are 
relevant interests and parties consulted? Would the legitimacy of decisions increase if an element of 
democracy were introduced into governance and management practices (Arneson, 2003)? 
 
Those who feel they have a significant stake in an enterprise are more likely to be engaged. In the 
case of many listed companies ultimate ownership is widely dispersed and often apathetic. Many 
individuals hold diversified portfolios within which, as mentioned above, an individual investment 
might not justify a significant allocation of time. In any event, when such investments have been 
acquired via a pension fund or collective investment vehicle, voting rights may be in the hands of 
fund managers. For certain companies however the challenge may be a different one of dealing with 
engaged and motivated investors, some of whom may not be shy of expressing their views on social 
media and elsewhere and seeking wider support. Are boards aware, sensitive, flexible, balanced and 
proportinate when determining whether or not and how to respond? 
 
Boardroom Issues and Challenges 
 
Boards and their activities, errors of judgement and omissions continue to be under the spotlight. 
Despite the attention given to various codes and guidelines, there have been catastrophic failures of 
corporate governance. Some directors have missed golden opportunities, while others have seized 
them. Companies have been driven into the ground. Many boards are narrow and lacking in 
diversity. Should more be done to increase the proportion of women directors as suggested by the 
Tyson Report (2003), or to widen the gene pool from which directors are selected? Would greater 
diversity and freedom of thought in boards and across corporate organisations stimulate creativity, 
enable innovation and support entrepreneurship (Coulson-Thomas, 2017c & d)? 
 
When civil servants compile a governance code for an area of the public sector the result can 
sometimes be flawed (e.g. Monitor, 2013). Should parts of the public, voluntary and professional 
sectors rejoice or be concerned that they have been no-go areas for much of contemporary corporate 
governance? Do some of its cornerstones miss the point? Shouldn't boards play a more positive role 
in innovation, responsible risk taking and building a better tomorrow? Why are so many boards 
excessively cautious and risk averse wet blankets, smothering initiative, preocupied with 
compliance and either oblivious to opportunities or perceiving them as problems or threats? 
 
For many years before the Cadbury Report (1992) stressed their importance, independent directors 
had their champions (e.g. Tricker, 1978). Are they the panacea that their high profile in governance 
codes might suggest? Has the contemporary focus upon independent directors been excessive? Has 
it divided boards? For many companies, what contribution have independendent directors made to 
better corporate governance (Kumar, 2013)?  Have we lost sight of the individual and collective 
duties and responsibilities of all directors? Is the real issue that all directors should exercise 
independent judgement and be free of obligations and vested and special interests that might 
prevent them from being objective? Rather than one set of directors acting as a check upon another, 
shouldn't they all be working together for the future success of companies? 
 
Should directors and boards do more to ensure that corporate governance codes, standards and 
regulations are current, relevant and reflect contemporary realities and concerns and a wider range 
of interests? What are they contributing to the social responsibilities of business (Bowen, 1953)? 
Should more attention be given to ethical and other codes and best practice guidance for investors 
and other stakeholders? Given what has happened to corporate governance, might this be counter 
productive? Are new and revised rules, regulations and codes required in areas such as insolvency 
and corporate rescue and recovery from potential insolvency? What else would benefit from a 
review? How can boards work with regulators without compromising their independence? 
 
“Culture” has become fashionable (FRC, 2016). Is it a fundamental issue or a fad? Are behaviours 
rather than culture the issue, what people from various cultures and differing beliefs actually do? 
What about the characters, personalities, motivations and conduct of directors? Are the right 
attributes being sought in new appointees to boards? While achievement, intelligence and 
judgement may have been demonstrated in the past, are the qualities which led to appointments as 
directors still evident in today's boardrooms? Do directors have the information and support they 
need to make effective decisions? Do they take sufficient steps to remain current and competent?  
 
Adressing Sustainability Challenges 
 
Finally, is the current pattern and model of growth sustainable (Higgs, 2014)? A major challenge for 
many boards is balancing short-term requirements emanating from market, competitive and other 
pressures with longer-term challenges such as ensuring environmental sustainability and coping 
with the impact of climate change. In the process, are new business possibilities being overlooked? 
Entrepreneurial boards recognise that where trends and developments impact upon customers and 
other external parties this can create an opportunity to craft offerings that enable them to cope. 
Addressing sustainability challenges requires openness and transparency in acknowledging and 
confronting realities, resilience and flexibility when withstanding pressures, and innovation where 
more than incremental improvement is required. 
 
Are boards doing enough to ensure the openness, transparency, resilience, flexibility and innovation 
required to develop more sustainable practices and business models? Are they aware of voluntary 
Paris Agreement (2015) obligations and focused upon UN (2015) sustainable development goals? 
Are directors engaging with management, those for whom they are responsible and other 
stakeholders to ensure they understand the issues, what needs to be done to ensure sustainable and 
inclusive growth and development, how their companies and others will be affected, and how they 
might contribute? Are goals, objectives, strategies, policies and priorities being reviewed and 
changed where appropriate? Have constraints and limiting factors been identified? Are more 
sustainable practices and green growth solutions being developed, scaled up or rolled out? 
 
The questions of to whom a board is accountable and for what, and whether responsibilities and 
accountabilities need to be widened beyond the financial interests of shareholders, is particularly 
pressing in relation to the environment and sustainability. The creativity of companies in reducing 
renewable energy costs needs to be followed by other innovations. The nature and scale of the 
challenge has also broadened certain reporting requirements to encompass environmental issues. 
Are boards doing enough in environmental monitoring and their adoption of integrated performance 
reporting? Is the information that they do provide actually wanted, read and used? Could and should 
compliance and performance for sustainability be made more accountable? 
 
Future Prospects 
 
In relation to many of the issues to be considered at the 2017 London Global Convention is there a 
case for additional, better and more flexible Government action, or are we already over-regulated? 
In the case of the environment and sustainability, effective regulation in a country such as India is a 
significant challenge (Mejia, 2009). How cost effective are regulators and how should their 
performance be measured (Radaeli and Fritsch, 2012)? Is too much of the existing regulatory 
activity and Government intervention adding to the costs of doing business and counter-productive 
(Crews, 2017)? Do boards need to become more involved in the process of the formulation and 
implementation planning of interventions, not to protect their vested interests, but to help to ensure 
relevant, timely and proportionate responses, and to create better outcomes in terms of ease of 
implementation, enabling innovation and beneficial impacts?  
 
Should we be optimistic or pessimistic about the future of corporate governance and/or more 
sustainable corporate aspirations, business practices and lifestyles? How many more reports, task 
forces and working parties will there need to be before the public notice governance improvements? 
Is it only when corporate failures and governance scandals occur that people reflect on directors and 
boards? Will enough entrepreneurs and directors explore new ways of operating and governing and 
deliver the innovations that will enable us to address our governance and sustainability issues?  
 
Further Information 
 
Details of the 17th London Global Convention on Corporate Governance and Sustainability can be 
found on: http://www.iodglobal.com/london-global-convention-2017.html 
 
The convention is organised by the Institute of Directors: http://www.iodglobal.com/ 
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